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PRIVATE SUITS UNDER WASHINGTON'S
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: THE PUBLIC
INTEREST REQUIREMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970 the Washington legislature amended the Consumer Protection
Act, I conferring upon private parties standing to sue2 for unfair or decep-
tive business practices. 3 The Washington Supreme Court, construing this
provision in Lightfoot v. MacDonald,4 significantly narrowed the appar-
ent scope of the private remedy.5 Relying on the purpose section of the
statute, 6 the court noted that the Act did not grant "an additional remedy
for private wrongs which do not affect the public generally." 7 It held that
in order for a private party to recover for the proscribed unfair or decep-
tive acts, the conduct complained of must be "vulnerable to a complaint
by the Attorney General under the Act."'8 In other words, the act or
practice must affect the public interest. 9
This comment discusses the current state of the law in the area of pri-
vate remedies for unfair business practices and focuses on two questions:
(1) Is the public interest requirement for private suits under the Act justi-
fied? (2) What are the appropriate tests for finding an effect on the public
interest? The comment concludes that the statutory purpose and historical
context justify the public interest requirement but that the Washington
1. Unfair Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, ch. 26, § 2, 1970 Wash. Laws 202
(codified at WASH. Rav. CODE § 19.86.090 (1976)). The Consumer Protection Act (the Act) is found
in R.C.W. ch. 19.86.
2. "Any person who is injured in his business or property by a violation of RCW 19.86.020
.. may bring a civil action in the superior court to enjoin further violations, to recover the
actual damages sustained by him, or both, together with the costs of the suit, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee, and the court may in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an
amount not to exceed three times the actual damages sustained: Provided, That such increased
damage award for violation of RCW 19.86.020 may not exceed one thousand dollars."
WAsH. REv. CODE § 19.86.090 (1976).
3. "Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." WASH. Rav. CODE § 19.86.020 (1976).
4. 86 Wn. 2d 331, 544 P.2d 88 (1976).
5. See Comment, Attempts to Restrict Actionable Conduct Pursuant to Washington's Consumer
Protection Act, 12 GoIcz. L. Ray. 621 (1977) (discussion of Lightfoot).
6. WA sH. REv. CooE § 19.86.920 (1976).
7. 86 Wn. 2d at 333, 544 P.2d at 89.
8. Id. at 334, 544 P.2d at 90.
9. The Lightfoot court noted that the attorney's acts in that case did not have "a sufficient impact
upon the public to qualify it as one of those acts or practices which are prohibited under RCW 19.-
86." Id. at 338-39, 544 P.2d at 92-93.
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courts have not yet developed a sufficiently specific test for determining
when the requirement has been met. A specific test is therefore suggested
to fulfill the appropriate function of the private remedy. The proposed
test requires the presence of (1) unequal bargaining power, (2) solicita-
tion or public offering, and (3) the probability of repetition of the transac-
tion which forms the basis of the complaint.
This three-part test explains the results in the Washington cases and
adheres to the proper scope of the private remedy. The specificity of this
test should aid both courts and private litigants in their determination
whether a given transaction sufficiently affects the public interest to
bring it within the Act's protection.
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
REQUIREMENT FOR PRIVATE REMEDIES UNDER THE
WASHINGTON CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
A. The Cases Considering Public Interest
On its face, Washington's Consumer Protection Act does not require
that a private party show an effect on the public interest to bring a suc-
cessful action for injunction or damages. The private remedy section ap-
pears to require only that the plaintiff suffer injury as a result of unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. 10
However, in the purpose section of the Act, the Washington legislature
declared that although it intended the Act to be "liberally construed that
its beneficial purpose may be served," it intended also that "this act shall
not be construed to prohibit acts or practices which are reasonable in rela-
tion to the development and preservation of business or which are not
injurious to the public interest." ' I
In Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 12 the Washington Supreme Court consid-
ered an allegation that an attorney's failure to act on a threatened mort-
gage foreclosure, which resulted in the loss of the plaintiff's property,
constituted a violation of the unfair practices section of the Act. Relying
on the purpose section's mandate that in construing the Act the courts
should "look to [the interpretation given by the federal courts to] 'the var-
ious federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters,' 113 the
Lightfoot court considered federal case law involving the private treble
10. See notes 2 and 3 supra.
11. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.920 (1976).
12. 86 Wn. 2d 331, 544 P.2d 88 (1976).
13. Id. at 335, 544 P.2d at 90 (quoting WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.920 (1976)).
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damage antitrust remedy. 14 It concluded that both the federal and state
provisions were designed to enlist private citizens' aid in enforcement of
the laws, "[which] is desirable only if it serves the public interest and im-
plements the purpose of the statute."' 15 Consequently, the court incorpo-
rated the public interest language from the purpose section into the sec-
tion proscribing unfair practices, 16 and decided that since the plaintiff
had not shown that the attorney's acts were "injurious to the public,"'17
she could not recover under the Act's private remedy. 18
Later Washington cases show when the public interest is sufficiently
affected to satisfy the Lightfoot requirement. In Fisher v. World-Wide
Trophy Outfitters,19 the court of appeals held that the placement of de-
ceptive advertisements in a magazine of general circulation was privately
actionable. The court did not address the question of public interest in-
volvement but did note that because "[p]laintiffs, members of the general
public to whom the advertising was directed, were damaged as a result of
defendants' advertisements," the advertisements constitutea "unfair or
deceptive acts within the meaning of RCW 19.86.020."20
A second court of appeals opinion, Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmo-
bile,21 found sufficient public interest involvement where defendant car
dealer offered to the public and sold to the plaintiff a used car which the
salesperson knew had been extensively modified as a racing vehicle,
without informing the buyer who did not desire to purchase a race car.
The Washington Supreme Court ruled that an insurance company com-
mitted an unfair act when it added an exclusion eliminating coverage for
a medical condition discovered in the plaintiff after she had purchased
the policy and paid the premium. The original policy contained no spe-
cial exclusions. In this case, Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 22
14. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1977).
15. 86 Wn. 2d at 336, 544 P.2d at 91.
16. The Lightfoot court held that "the alleged conduct of the respondent was not an unfair or
deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce as those terms are employed in the
Consumer Protection Act." Id. at 333, 544 P.2d at 89. This conclusion must be read with the court's
finding that the respondent's behavior did not sufficiently affect the public to fall within the Act's
prohibitions. See note 9 supra. The result of Lightfoot is that if an act is (1) unfair or deceptive, (2)
occurs in the conduct of trade or commerce, and (3) adversely affects the public interest, either the
attorney general or a private party may bring an action.
17. 86 Wn. 2d at 336, 544 P.2d at 91.
18. Id. at 338-39, 544 P.2d at 92-93.
19. 15 Wn. App. 742, 551 P.2d 1398 (1976).
20. Id. at 748, 551 P.2d at 1403.
21. 16 Wn. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976).
22. 90 Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978). Other Washington decisions have followed Salois.
See Levy v. North Am. Ins., 90 Wn. 2d 846, 586 P.2d 845 (1978); Rounds v. Union Bankers Ins.
Co., 22 Wn. App. 613, 590 P.2d 1286 (1979).
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the requisite public interest involvement was founded upon the
declaration, in a statute other than the Consumer Protection Act itself,
that "the business of insurance is one affected by the public interest. '23
The court also found that the defendant insurance company had breached
its duty of good faith and fair dealing mandated by the same statute. 24
Combining its findings of illegality and violation of public policy, the
court concluded that the insurance company's conduct constituted a per
se violation of the Consumer Protection Act.25
The cases where no public interest involvement was found and where
recovery was denied are especially useful in defining the public interest
requirement. The court of appeals case of Allen v. Anderson26 involved
the sale by the builder-owner of an apartment building with various struc-
tural defects. The trial court found that the seller had originally planned
to occupy one unit and rent the others. He had not listed the building for
sale and the particular buyer had approached him on his own initiative.
That court characterized the transaction as possessing an "isolated qual-
23. The relevant section of the statute reads: "The business of insurance is one affected by the
public interest, requiring that all persons be actuated by good faith, abstain from deception, and
practice honesty and equity in all insurance matters." WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (1976).
24. 90 Wn. 2d at 359, 581 P.2d at 1351.
25. Id. at 359, 581 P.2d at 1351. The concept of a per se violation of the Act was first an-
nounced in State v. Readers' Digest Ass'n., 81 Wn. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972). This case held
that a sweepstakes lottery, which was illegal and against public policy, was "per se unfair within the
meaning of RCW 19.86.020." Id. at 276, 501 P.2d at 302. In so holding, the court rejected the
position advanced by the Attorney General that a per se violation may be found if an act is illegal or
against public policy. Rather, the court propounded a dual standard, requiring that for an act to be
per se unfair, it must be illegal and against public policy. See Comment, State v. Readers' Digest
Association-a Knockout Punch to Unfair or Deceptive Ads or Practices in Washington?, 10 GONZ.
L. REV. 529, 535 & n.21 (1975). As the Salois court applied the concept, once a per se violation of
the unfair practices section is found, no further inquiry into public interest is required. A per se vio-
lation is not an "exception to the public interest requirement," as argued by appellants in Salois.
Appellants' Reply Brief at 11, Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wn. 2d 355. 581 P.2d 1349
(1978), but rather represents an additional way for the courts to find public interest involvement.
The per se doctrine was applied more narrowly in Dempsey v. Joe Pignataro Chevrolet. Inc.. 22
Wn. App. 384, 589 P.2d 1265 (1979). In an action alleging failure of defendant car dealer to honor
its new vehicle warranty, the Dempsey court noted that a per se violation of the Consumer Protection
Act might be founded upon a violation of the unfair motor vehicles practices law. R.C.W ch. 46.70.
Id. at 392-93, 589 P.2d at 1270. The court stated that "[u]nder the per se doctrine, an infringement
of a statute designed to protect the public is considered inimical to the public interest and, therefore.
on that basis is by itself an unfair or deceptive practice condemned by the [Aict." Id. at 392. 589
P.2d at 1270 (emphasis added). This narrow view of the per se doctrine is not warranted by the Sa-
lois holding.
The second holding of Salois, overruling Johnston v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America,
85 Wn. 2d 637, 538 P.2d 510 (1975), which held that the Consumer Protection Act covers only
those acts designed to effect a sale, is outside the scope of this comment.
26. 16 Wn. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24 (1976).
Consumer Protection Act: Public Interest Requirement
ity." 27 The court of appeals quoted the public interest language of Light-
foot and affirmed the dismissal of the claim.
In Pilch v. Hendrix,28 the court of appeals held that the failure of
defendant-builder to replace concrete steps at plaintiff's residence in a
"workmanlike manner" did not "support a remedy under the Consumer
Protection Act." 29 Citing Lightfoot to support its decision, the court con-
cluded that the facts of the case "establish[ed] nothing more than a breach
of a private contract not affecting the public interest. 30
Another court of appeals opinion, Lookebill v. Mom's Mobile Homes,
Inc.,31 involved a mobile home dealer's violation of the Retail Install-
ment Sales Act 32 by failing to include the date and seller's name and ad-
dress on the Conditional Sales Security Agreement and by four separate
violations in the Notice to Buyer. 33 The plaintiffs sought to prove that
these violations constituted unfair or deceptive practices under the
Consumer Protection Act. Again citing Lightfoot, the court held that the
evidence was insufficient to establish injury to the public and refused to
reach the merits of plaintiffs' argument. 34
The Washington Supreme Court, in Brown v. Charlton,35 refused to
find public interest involvement where a subdivision's domestic water
system was not maintained, and the individual lot owners brought an ac-
tion against the developer and his successor-in-interest, relying in part on
the Consumer Protection Act's private remedy. The court cited the Salois
finding of legislatively determined public interest in the insurance busi-
ness. It found the converse situation with the water system involved: "In
the instant case, the legislature has determined that certain small-scale
water providers are not subject to public interest regulation. '36 The court
27. Id. at 447, 557 P.2d at 25.
28. 22 Wn. App. 531, 591 P.2d 824 (1979).
29. Id. at 532, 591 P.2d at 826.
30. Id. at 533, 591 P.2d at 826.
31. 16 Wn. App. 817, 559 P.2d 600 (1977).
32. WASH. REv. Cone ch. 63.14 (1976).
33. 16 Wn. App. at 820-21, 559 P.2d at 603.
34. Id. at 823, 559 P.2d at 604-05. Similarly, the court of appeals in Dempsey v. Joe Pignataro
Chevrolet, Inc., 22 Wn. App. 384, 589 P.2d 1265 (1979), decided that since the facts showed that
the deception involved in a car dealer's failure to honor its new car warranty related only "to the
transaction between the dealer and the purchasers," the public interest requirement was not satisfied.
Id. at 392, 589 P.2d at 1270. However, the Dempsey court noted that a cause of action might be
based on the per se doctrine and remanded for findings on that question. See note 25 supra.
35. 90 Wn. 2d 362, 583 P.2d 1188 (1978).
36. Id. at 368, 583 P.2d at 1192. The statute referred to identifies businesses which are subject
to public regulation. "Water company" is defined to exclude "any water system serving less than
sixty customers where the average annual gross revenue per customer does not exceed one hundred
twenty dollars per year." WASH. Ray. CoDE § 80.04.010 (1976).
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concluded that because there was no proof that "the private dispute af-
fected the public interest, '37 the Consumer Protection Act failed to pro-
vide plaintiffs with a cause of action.
B. Problems with the Public Interest Requirement as Stated by the
Courts
Since the courts have not specified the requisite degree or type of ef-
fect on public interest, neither courts nor litigants have guidance in deter-
mining when the requirement is met.38 Liberally construed, an effect on
the public interest can be found in virtually any transaction. Conversely,
the minimum effect required may be set so high as to eliminate from the
sphere of the Act's protection all but a few transactions. Confusion re-
garding the meaning of the requirement is manifested by an apparent
conflict among the courts of appeals. Both Lookebill,39 the mobile home
case, and Testo,40 the used car case, involved a consumer injured by a
particular act of a dealership. Although both cases seemed to involve an
effect on the public interest, the court found such an effect in the latter
case but not in the former. This inconsistency of results suggests the need
for the development of a more definite test.
A second problem with the requirement as it is currently used is that,
in seeking to prove public interest involvement, both courts and litigants
often resort to counting how many others have been similarly injured by
37. 90 Wn. 2d at 368, 583 P.2d at 1192.
38. Construction of statutory requirements of public interest in other areas of the law has not
clarified the problem. One example comes from the area of state police power. The United States
Supreme Court, discussing a Kansas statute which declared the food preparation industry to be af-
fected with a public interest and sought to regulate wages in that industry, noted:
It is very difficult under the cases to lay down a working rule by which to readily determine
when a business has become 'clothed with a public interest.' All business is subject to some
kinds of public regulation, but when the public becomes so peculiarly dependent upon a particu-
lar business that one engaging therein subjects himself to a more intimate public regulation is
only to be determined by the process of exclusion and inclusion and to gradual establishment of
a line of distinction.
Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 538-39 (1923).
The Wolff court gave what has been termed "the most succinct and . . . inclusive statement of
the criteria for determining when a property is affected with a public interest." Hertz Drivurself
Stations, Inc. v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464, 472 (1948). The Wolff court explained:
"The circumstances which clothe a particular kind of business with a public interest, . . . must be
such as to create a peculiarly close relation between the public and those engaged in it, and raise
implications of an affirmative obligation on their part to be reasonable in dealing with the public."
262 U.S. at 536.
39. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
40. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
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the contested practice.41 This approach originated in the Lightfoot court's
suggestion that, for the public interest to be affected, multiple injuries
must flow from the deceptive conduct,42 even though the Act requires
only that consumers be affected indirectly. 43 The court of appeals sought
to deal with this apparent inconsistency by explaining that the supreme
court in Lightfoot did not intend to place such a "constrictive interpreta-
tion on the act" and "did not intend to limit private consumer protection
actions to only those situations where defendant's actions cause actual in-
jury to numerous consumers." 44 Unfortunately, the supreme court has
not clarified its holding in Lightfoot. Consumer litigants continue to
count heads to prove public interest involvement. 45 This approach is both
impractical and theoretically unsound. The first injured consumer must
be allowed a cause of action. Even if the public interest requirement can
be justified, it must be redefined.
I. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST
REQUIREMENT
The requirement of public interest involvement for a private recovery
under the Consumer Protection Act is justified by reference to the pur-
pose section of the Act, to analogous federal statutory and case law, to
the historical context of the Act's passage, and to policy considerations.
A. The Purpose Section
The Washington Consumer Protection Act contains a purpose section46
which should be followed by the court if it is intended to guide interpre-
41. In arguing that the insurance company's act in Salois was per se unfair, the appellant argued
that an injured consumer seeking to prove public interest involvement would have to engage in ex-
tensive and costly pre-trial discovery to locate other consumers subjected to the same practice. She
further urged that "[i]f public interest or harm must be established as a matter of 'fact' in a case such
as this, then, Lightfoot literally requires that a consumer have the makings of a class action before a
private remedy can be obtained under the Consumer Protection Act." Appellants' Reply Brief at 13,
Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349(1978).
42. "A breach of a private contract affecting no one but the parties to the contract. . . is not an
act or practice affecting the public interest." 86 Wn. 2d at 334, 544 P.2d at 90.
43. " 'Trade' and 'commerce' shall include the sales of assets or services, and any commerce
directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state of Washington." WAsH. Rv. CODE § 19.86.010
(1976). The proscriptions in the unfair practices section of the Act relate to acts occurring "in the
conduct of any trade or commerce." Id. at § 19.86.020.
44. Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wn. App. 39, 52, 554 P.2d 349, 358 (1976).
45. The appellant in Salois asked "how many consumers would have Salois have had to have
called to establish public harm? Ten? Twenty? One Hundred?" Appellants' Reply Brief at 13, Salois
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978).
46. WASH. REv. CoD § 19.86.920 (1976).
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tation, is consistent with the words and context of the statute, and is rele-
vant to the question in issue. 47 The purpose section was enacted in 1961
as part of the original Act, along with the unfair practices section and the
other sections which contain antitrust provisions.48 The private remedy
section, as originally enacted, granted private parties standing to sue only
for a violation of the antitrust sections. 49 A private cause of action for a
violation of the unfair practices section was added to the private remedy
section by a 1970 amendment. 50 Under the general rule of statutory
construction that a statute be read as a whole, the amended section and
the unaltered sections of the Act should be considered together. 51 Ac-
cordingly, the purpose section of the Act may be viewed as a broad inter-
pretive guide to the statute, both as originally enacted and as amended,
and the Lightfoot court was justified in relying on the 1961 purpose sec-
tion to clarify the 1970 enactment. 52
B. Analogous Federal Statutes and Case Law
Following the purpose section's mandate to be guided by federal law
dealing "with the same or similar matters," 53 the Lighifoot court looked
to the Federal Trade Commission Act54 and the federal antitrust laws 55
for guidance. The unfair practices section of Washington's Consumer
Protection Act was patterned after Section 5 of the FTC Act. 56 That sec-
tion of the federal act "was designed to prohibit conduct similar to that
47. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1413 (Tentative ed. 1958) (Harvard Univ.).
48. 1961 Wash. Laws ch. 211.
49. Section 19.86.030 declares contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or
commerce unlawful; section 19.86.050 declares agreements not to use or to deal in a competitor's
commodities or services unlawful; section 19.86.060 declares the acquisition of one corporation's
stock by another to lessen competition unlawful.
50. Unfair Business Practices and Consumer Protection, ch. 26, § 2, 1970 Wash. Laws 1st Ex.
Sess. 203 (1970). This was one of several amendments to the Act which the Attorney General
lobbied through the legislature. Reed, Consumer Protection in Washington: An Overview. 10 GONZ.
L. REV. 391, 393 (1975).
51. 1A C. SANDS, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 22.34, 22.35 (4th ed. 1972) (rev. of
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION).
52. The Lightfoot court stated: "Since the purpose of the act is to protect the public interest,
it is natural to assume that the legislature, in granting a private remedy in RCW 19.86.090, in-
tended to further implement the protection of that interest." 86 Wn. 2d at 334, 544 P.2d at 90.
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1976).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1977).
55. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1977): Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730
(1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27, 29 U.S.C. § 52(1973).
56. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)(1976) ("Unfair methods of competition in or affecting com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are [hereby] declared un-
lawful") with WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1976), supra note 3.
As originally enacted, § 5 of the FTC Act outlawed "unfair methods of competition," which the
802
Consumer Protection Act: Public Interest Requirement
prohibited by the Sherman Act, and, like the Clayton Act.... to prohibit
practices which do not measure up to the proportions of a restraint of
trade or monopolization. ' 57 Since antitrust and consumer protection leg-
islation share common historical roots58 and related goals,59 the Lighffoot
court was justified in looking to them as "similar" federal statutes. 60
As one basis for its finding of a public interest requirement, the Light-
foot court relied on the United States Supreme Court ruling that to justify
a complaint by the FTC, "the public interest must be specified and sub-
stantial. '61 However, the FTC Act is enforced solely by the Federal
Trade Commission; it provides no private remedy for a violation of its
unfair practices section although both legislative reform62 and judicial in-
terpretation 63 have been attempted to redress this omission. The court in
United States Supreme Court construed to apply only where the FrC found injuries to competition.
FrC v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643 (1931). In 1938 Congress amended § 5 to include as unlawful
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices," extending the reach of the Act to those practices affecting
consumers without necessarily affecting competition. Act of March 21, 1938, Pub. L. No. 447, § 3,
52 Stat. 111 (Wheeler-Lea Amendments).
57. Dewell & Gittinger, The Washington Antitrust Laws, 36 WASH. L. REv. 239, 251 (1961).
58. "That both the Congress and the Washington Legislature have seen fit to codify 'antitrust'
law with 'consumer protection' law is evidence of their clear intentions to base these laws upon the
same public policy and to treat them similarly." Comment, Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Treble
Damages-Balancing the Scale of Consumer Justice, 10 GoNz. L. REv. 593, 597 (1975).
"When originally passed in 1961, the Act was viewed primarily as an antitrust statute incorporat-
ing the basic provisions of federal antimonopoly legislation." Boeder, Consumer Case Indexing Pro-
ject, 28 WASH. ST. B. NEws 9 (1974).
59. The goal of federal antitrust law has been construed as the preventioi "of restraints to free
competition in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices
or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods or services, all
of which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury." Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 255 F.2d 214, 225 (9th Cir. 1958) (quoting Apex Hosiery Co..v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469, 493 (1940)). The Lightfoot court determined that the antitrust laws are "relevant in that they
also deal with problems of business practices, regulating, as they do, monopolies and combinations
in restraint of trade." 86 Wn. 2d at 335, 544 P.2d at 90.
60. 86 Wn. 2d at 335, 544 P.2d at 90.
61. FrC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929), cited in Lightfoot, 86 Wn. 2d at 334, 544 P.2d at
90.
62. Several bills have been introduced in Congress to amend the FrC Act to provide for private
remedies. Their failure has been linked to the inability of the nation's legislators "to agree on the
exact nature of the private remedy." Note, Private Remedies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts: The
Judicial Approaches of Statutory Interpretation and Implication, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 413, 420 &
nn.36, 38 & 39 (1972).
63. The majority of federal opinions hold that only the FTC can seek judicial enforcement of the
FrC Act. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (FTC is best
able to enforce Act because of its special expertise and discretion). But see Guernsey v. Rich Plan of
the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (where FrC has already ruled that a particular
party's practice violates the Act, consumers have a cause of action for that same practice). See gen-
erally Note, Federal Trade Commission Act: A Private Cause of Action for Consumers: Guernsey v.
Rich Plan of the Midwest, 9 CoNN. L. Rev. 294 (1977); Note, Administrative Law-Federal Trade
Commission Act-Consumer Private Right of Action Recognized under Section 5, 29 VANO. L. REv.
1077 (1976).
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Lightfoot recognized that this requirement that the public interest be spe-
cific and substantial applies only to public agencies, and thus it looked
for further guidance to the private treble damage remedy afforded anti-
trust violations. 64 The federal courts, in construing this remedy, have
consistently held that it was intended as an "additional means" of enforc-
ing the act and that it also depended on a finding of public interest in-
volvement. 65 Thus, both the FTC Act and federal antitrust legislation
support the Lightfoot court's conclusion that the public interest require-
ment may be applied to the private remedy afforded for violations of the
unfair practices section of Washington's Consumer Protection Act.
C. Historical Context
Examination of the consumer climate at the time the Act was passed
illuminates the intent of the Washington legislators in enacting a con-
sumer protection statute. 66 Both the Act and its amendments should be
viewed in the context of the heightened consumer protection activity that
occurred in the 1960's. A combination of factors, including questionable
marketing practices, accelerating technological change, and an increas-
ingly aware and vocal populace, 67 caused an increase in legislative ac-
tivity on both the federal and state levels68 aimed at safeguarding the
consumer's right to be informed, to choose, to be heard, and to be pro-
tected from injury. 69 Practices which were most responsible for victimiz-
64. "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
65. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 255 F.2d 214, 231 (9th Cir. 1958). Accord.
Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975)
(the treble damage provision is "an incentive for private parties to instigate costly and uncertain liti-
gation, thus supplementing governmental enforcement"). See also cases cited in Lightfoot, 86 Wn.
2d at 335, 544 P.2d at 91.
66. To ascertain legislative intent, one must imagine oneself "in the position of the legislature
enacting the statute," assuming that the legislators were "reasonable men pursuing reasonable pur-
poses reasonably" and drawing upon the "general public knowledge of what was considered to be the
mischief that needed remedying." H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 47, at 1414-15. See generally
MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV.
L. REv. 863 (1930).
67. L. FELDMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 20 (1976). See also Barton.
Private Recourse for Consumers: Redress or Rape? in PROTECrING THE CONSUMER INTEREST 183.
184-85 (R. Katz ed. 1976).
68. See M. NADEL, THE PoLrrIcS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 33-35 (1971) (federal legislation); NA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, COMMrTTEE OF THE OFFICE OF ATrORNEY GENERAL AND
CONSUMER PROTECnON COMMrrTEE, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION 1-2 (1972) (state pro-
grams).
69. CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS, PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, SPECIAL MESSAGE ON PROTECTING THE
CONSUMER INTEREST (March 15, 1962), discussed in Barton, supra note 67.
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ing American consumers included offering an item at a phony special
low price, 70 "bait and switch" advertising, 71 chain referral sales, 72 free-
gimmick sales, 73 and the "fear-sell." 74 Other deceptive schemes included
charity swindles for nonexistent churches and hospitals, business-oppor-
tunity rackets, mailing of unsolicited merchandise, phony home im-
provements, land-fraud sales, and substandard correspondence and voca-
tional schools. 75 Most of these injurious practices do not occur in
isolation. 76 To prevent excessive harrassment of businesses, the Wash-
ington legislators may have sought to eliminate only those practices
which present a substantial hazard to the public, i.e., those which do not
occur in isolation. Although the public interest requirement lacks predic-
tability in its current form, at least it directs the court's attention toward
this legislative concern. With an adequately specific definition, the re-
quirement may more effectively advance the legislative purpose.
D. Policy Factors
The legal problems of consumers arise in one of two possible ways:
"[t]hey may be purely relational in that a particular controversy with a
seller is only a single transactional dispute" or they may be "the conse-
quence of a more generalized course of conduct by the seller. ' 77 By
requiring public interest involvement for the private remedy, the Wash-
ington courts are limiting the consumer's legal remedies to the latter situ-
ation. A remedy granting standing to the consumer for every individual
transactional dispute, regardless of its public impact, would be most con-
cerned with compensating the injured consumer. In contrast, a remedy
available only when many consumers are threatened stresses not
individual compensation but rather enlistment of private efforts in the en-
forcement of the Act's broader purposes. Certainly the Act's private rem-
70. W. (Senator Warren G.) MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE 3, 9
(1968).
71. Id. at 9-12.
72. Id. at 13-16.
73. Id. at 17-21.
74. Id. at 21-23.
75. Id. at 24-25. Other categorizations of the most serious consumer abuses echo these lists.
See, e.g., O'Connell, Consumer Protection in the State of Washington, 39 ST. GOV'T. 230, 231-32
(1966) (National Better Business Bureau's list of "America's Ten Most Widespread Consumer
Gyps"); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATroREYs GENERA., COMMITrEE ON Ti OFFICE OF ATrORNEY GEN-
EP.AL, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMR PRoTEcCnON 19 (Dec. 1973) (list of the most common types of
complaints received by state consumer protection agencies).
76. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Prob-
lems, 48 B.U.L. REv. 559, 565 (1968).
77. Id. at 564.
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edy section is designed to "make the victim financially whole," 78 but the
public interest requirement serves to narrow the class of victims to those
whose suits further the enforcement function of the Act, which the Light-
foot court concluded was the legislature's primary purpose in allowing
private remedies. 79
The court's stress on enforcement over compensation is consistent
with the legislature's inclusion of an award of reasonable attorney's fees
and exemplary damages in the private remedy section. Both provisions
are designed to induce private persons to undertake legal action. 80 The
legislature apparently recognized that without the prospect of recovering
attorney's fees and exemplary damages, the disproportion between the
small amount of compensation and the substantial attorney's fees com-
mon in many cases of consumer fraud would make private redress finan-
cially impractical. 81
In addition, the public interest requirement was one way the Washing-
ton courts sought to safeguard against opportunistic, vexatious private
suits8 2 which could result from the combination of the broad language in
78. Comment by Donald L. Navoni, Consumer Protection Subcommittee of the Young Lawyers
Section of the Seattle-King County Bar Association, quoted in Consumer-Protection Bill Adds
Money-Back Promise, Seattle Times, Jan. 25, 1970, at B-I, col. 3 (copy of article located in Uni-
versity of Washington Law Library's legislative clippings file). R.C.W. § 19.86.090 provides a
means, in part, for the injured party to recover his actual damages. See note 2 supra (text of R.C.W
§ 19.86.090 (1976)).
79. "We think the evident purpose of the legislature in providing a private remedy ... was
much the same as that which Congress expressed in providing for treble damage actions under
the antitrust laws. Its purpose was to enlist the aid of private individuals damaged by acts or
practices which were forbidden in the acts, to assist in the enforcement of the laws."
86 Wn. 2d at 335-36, 544 P.2d at 91. For a discussion of the dual functions of the federal private
antitrust remedy, see E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS § 3.01 (1965).
80. Section 19.86.080 empowers the attorney general to enforce the Act. WASH. REV. CODE §
19.86.080 (1976).
The Washington Supreme Court came closest to viewing the plaintiff as a private attorney general
under the Act in Hockley v. Hargitt, 82 Wn. 2d 337, 510 P.2d 1123 (1973). The court upheld an
injunction against future deceptive practices of defendant, a seller of "total divorce service" fran-
chises, and held that the Act's "broad public policy," as expressed in § 19.86.920, "is best served by
permitting an injured individual to enjoin future violations of RCW 19.86, even if such violations
would not directly affect the individual's own private rights." Id. at 350, 510 P.2d at 1133. It further
explained that "if a single litigant is allowed to represent the public and consumer fraud is proven.
the multiplicity of suits is avoided and the illegal scheme brought to a halt." Id. at 350-51, 510 P.2d
at 1133. However, in Hockley the court still required past injury to the plaintiff. Under a private
attorney general theory, the plaintiff need only have "minimal individual interests" to bring suit.
Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 76 YALE
L.J. 485, 499 n.62 (referring to Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630, 632 (2d Cir. 1953)).
81. Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protec-
tion, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 409 (1966).
82. One commentator notes that "the initiation of numerous suits ... would be costly either to
litigate or to settle." Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307,
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the unfair practices section83 and the possibility of an award of attorney's
fees and punitive damages. Sensitivity to the possibility of harrassment
of the "state's legitimate businessmen 84 and a concomitant reluctance to
overregulate commerce were evidenced in the final report of the con-
sumer advisory council which recommended the remedial legislation.85
When it required public interest involvement for private recovery under
the Act, the Lightfoot court reflected this council's belief that "[f]reedom
rather than restraint [of business] is the rule. ' 86 Furthermore, Washing-
ton's Consumer Protection Act lacks certain statutory safeguards, such as
a requirement of intentional violation, which, in other states, provide the
same protections as the public interest requirement. 87
340 (1969). Furthermore, if exemplary damages may be awarded, a merchant might prefer settle-
ment to litigation on open questions of law even if settlement is unwarranted. Id.
83. In enacting the FTC Act, Congress declined to specify unlawful acts because "[i]t is impos-
sible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to human
inventiveness in this field." H. R. CONF. RaP. No. 1142, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914). Instead,
the meaning of the words "unfair or deceptive practices in the conduct of trade or commerce" is
decided on a case by case basis under both Washington and federal law. Case law now provides a
guide to what acts are encompassed in this section, but the list continues to grow. 2 TRADE REG. RaP.
(CCH) 7521, 7524 (1974), 7527, 7530 (1971); see Dewell & Gittinger, supra note 57, at
253-56; Erxleben, The FTC's Kaleidoscopic Unfairness Statute: Section 5, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 333
(1975).
84. O'Connell, supra note 75, at 234.
85. WASHINGTON CONSUMER ADVISORY COUNCIL, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATE OF WASHING-
TON, A REPORTTO GOVERNOR ALBERT D. ROSELLINI 2-3 (1960).
86. Id. at 2.
87. An act is "unfair or deceptive" under federal law if it has the capacity or tendency to
deceive. Neither intent to deceive nor actual deception need be proved. 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
7530 (1971). The Washington courts have adopted the capacity to deceive test for the unfair prac-
tices section of the Act. See, e.g., Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., Inc., 22 Wn. App. 143, 149, 589
P.2d 283, 286 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 92 Wn.2d 548, - P.2d - (1979). Fisher v. World-
wide Trophy Outfitters, 15 Wn. App. 742, 748, 551 P.2d 1398, 1403 (1976). See also Comment,
Toward Effective Consumer Law Enforcement: The Capacity to Deceive Test Applied to Private Ac-
tions, 10 Goz. L. REv. 457 (1975).
The comparable Massachusetts act empowers the attorney general to promulgate rules defining the
prohibited acts more specifically, requires an attempt to settle before action may be brought, and
allows for punitive damages only in the case of an intentional violation. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1975). Oregon's deceptive trade practices act provides a private right of action
only for persons injured as a result of a willful violation. OR. REv. STAT. § 646.638 (1977). See also
Comment, The Private Remedy Under Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act, 56 ORE. L. REV. 490
(1977). California's consumer fraud law requires attempted settlement before an action may be
brought. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1782 (West 1973). The New Mexico act safeguards against undue har-
rassment of businessmen by allowing the court to require that plaintiffs pay costs and attorney fees
when it determines that the claim was groundless. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10 (1978). This scheme
has been viewed as a desirable combination of "financial encouragement and responsibility" serving
to protect both consumer rights and business interests. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legis-
lation, 46 TUL. L. REv. 724, 749 (1972).
The safeguards in the Washington Act, making the award of punitive damages discretionary and
setting the maximum amount of such award at one thousand dollars, do not equal the statutory safe-
guards of these other states. See note 2 supra. The Washington courts should confine awards of
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The Act has various advantages over other traditional common law
and statutory remedies, 88 which make it easier and more attractive to use.
For example, the Consumer Protection Act's statute of limtations is four
years89 as contrasted with three years for tort actions. 90 In addition, attor-
ney's fees can seldom be recovered under the other remedies available to
consumers, 91 but can be recovered under the Act. The tension between
these liberalizing provisions in the Act and the legislative aversion to
overregulation warrants the limitation of private enforcement achieved
by the public interest requirement.
IV. SUGGESTED ANALYSIS FOR FINDING PUBLIC
INTEREST
Although the public interest requirement for private suits under the Act
is justifiable, the courts have applied it in ways which provide little guid-
ance for knowing when it is satisfied. If the public interest requirement is
viewed as directed at those practices in trade or commerce 92 which pre-
sent a substantial risk of harm to the public, the elements of the require-
ment may be defined to reflect the goals of consumer protection
legislation.
A. The Three-Part Test for Public Interest Involvement
A normative ideal behind consumer protection activity in this country
punitive damages to cases where a greater degree of culpability (i.e., purpose, intent, or knowledge)
accompanies the violation. This would be in keeping with the theoretical underpinnings of punitive
damages and with codifications in other states.
88. The traditional legal theories upon which an injured consumer can rely are: (1) common law
tort action for deceit which requires proof of false representation, knowledge by defendant of its
falsity, and justifiable reliance by plaintiff on the misrepresentation; (2) strict-liability tort action
confined to use in cases of personal injury resulting from product use; (3) contract action for rescis-
sion and restitution for material misrepresentation as limited by the parol evidence rule and the de-
fense of mere "puffing;" (4) breach of warranty action with the same limitations as (3) above; and (5)
unconscionability under § 2-302 of the UCC. S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 513-15 (3d ed. 1974). See also 2 D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, CON.
SUMER PROTECTION § 20.03 (1978). The Washington courts have recognized that the Act's private
remedy is in addition to those otherwise available. MacCormack v. Robins, I I Wn. App. 80. 82,
521 P.2d 761, 762 (1974) (holding breach of warranty action could still be maintained by a plaintiff
who failed to satisfy the requirements of the Act).
89. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.120 (1976).
90. WASH. Rav. CODE § 4.16.080 (1976). It appears that the longer statute of limitations under
the Act was one reason that plaintiff in Lightfoot sought to use it. 86 Wn. 2d at 332, 544 P.2d at 89.
91. See Comment, supra note 58, at 607 n.63.
92. See note 43 supra.
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is the encouragement of the free enterprise system. 93 One objective of
consumer protection legislation is to maximize the consumer's freedom
of choice by reducing the usual disparity in bargaining power between
the seller and the buyer. 94 This goal was expressed in the report of the
consumer adisory council which recommended the Washington legisla-
tion. 95 Therefore one part of the test for a sufficient effect on the public
interest is possession by the seller of superior bargaining power to that of
the buyer.
The second part of the test for the public interest requirement can be
gleaned from the "trade or commerce" provision of the Act. In noting
that ihe Lightfoot holding was correct on its facts, the supreme court in
Salois explained that in the earlier case "there was a failure to show that
the private dispute affected the public interest or was within the sphere of
trade or commerce as required by the statute. ' 96 When coupled with the
Lightfoot court's finding that "[tihere is no suggestion that the respondent
advertised his services or solicited the appellant or others to become his
client, ' 97 this dictum in Salois suggests that a seller engages in the requi-
site trade or commerce only when he solicits customers or by some
means of public offering holds himself open to the public for business.
The third part of the test, that the transaction in question be recurring
in nature, is derived from the conclusion in Allen,98 the apartment build-
ing case, that the Consumer Protection Act does not apply to an isolated
sale of real estate, 99 and from an intuitive sense of the proper scope of
such a statutory remedy. 100
The Uniform Commercial Code's concept of "merchant" illustrates
how the three-part test for the public interest requirement may be met.
The Code defines merchant as "a person who deals in goods of the kind
93. Krattenmaker, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection: An Institutional
Overview, in PROTECrNG THE CONSUMER INTEREST 105-09 (R. Katz ed. 1978).
94. Consumer protection refers to "those efforts that directly preserve consumers' power to
voice effectively and articulately their true desires in the market place." Id. at 108. Consumerism is
"an effort to put the buyer on an equal footing with the seller." Betty Furness, quoted in L. FELDMAN,
CONSUMER PROTECTION 4 (1976). See also Commonwealth v. De Cotis, 366 Mass. 234, 316 N.E.2d
748, 752 (1974) (The Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act was designed to provide "a more
equitable balance in the relationship of consumers to persons conducting business activities"). Ac-
cord, Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812, 816 (1974).
95. "Freedom of commerce... should not be permitted to result in license to exploit and abuse
the relatively unequal bargaining relationship between supplier and consumer that exists in today's
complex market place." WASHINGTON CONSUMER ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 85, at 46.
96. 90 Wn. 2d at 361, 581 P.2d at 1352.
97. 86 Wn. 2d at 336, 544 P.2d at 91.
98. 16 Wn. 2d at 446, 557 P.2d at 24.
99. Id. at 447, 557 P.2d at 25.
100. See last paragraph, Part IV-B infra.
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or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction."101 As
thus defined, the concept of merchant may include the unequal bargain-
ing power requirement, for the merchant possesses specialized knowl-
edge or skill. It also encompasses the solicitation/public offering compo-
nent; a merchant is someone who "holds himself out" to the public.
Furthermore, the UCC definition demonstrates how the requirement of
repeatability may be satisfied: if an unfair act is done to one person by a
"merchant" in the course of "his occupation," it is very likely repeatable.
The "merchant" need not have already injured others. If the act was com-
mitted within the scope of the merchant's occupation, the risk of further
harm to the public is substantial.
For each transaction forming the basis of a complaint, the courts
should ask whether these three criteria existed: unequal bargaining
power, solicitation/public offering, and repeatability. The presence of
these components indicates that the acts of the defendant present a sub-
stantial risk to the public which is sufficient to justify a private recovery
under the Act.
B. Application of the Proposed Test to Washington Cases and
Hypotheticals
This proposed analysis is consistent with the decisions of the Washing-
ton courts under the Act. In the case of a used car dealer, as in Testo v.
Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 102 the three components of the public
interest requirement are clearly present. A car dealer possesses greater
bargaining power than an individual consumer. By virtue of operating a
"store" which is visible and open to the public he satisfies the solicita-
tion/public offering component, and because the questionable act oc-
curred in the course of selling used cars, which was the business of the
defendant, the act is repeatable. 103 Similarly, in the other cases where
private recovery was allowed under the Consumer Protection Act, 104 the
three-part test for an effect on the public interest is also satisfied.
101. U.C.C. § 2-104. This broad definition of merchant may include professionals such as law-
yers or doctors.
102. 16 Wn. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976), discussed in text accompanying note 21 supra.
103. These criteria are also met in Lookebill v. Mom's Mobile Homes, 16 Wn. App. 817. 559
P.2d 600 (1977), whose result is inconsistent with that of Testo. Under the proposed test, Lookebill
would have been decided differently. See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra (discussion of Looke-
bill).
104. Salois v. Mutual of Omaha, 90 Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978), discussed in notes
22-25 and accompanying text supra; Fisher v. World-Wide Trophy Outfitters, 15 Wn. App. 742.
551 P.2d 1398 (1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
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Those cases in which the public interest was found not to be affected
provide a greater challenge for the validity of the proposed analysis. In
Allen v. Anderson, 105 the three components of the test were either miss-
ing or extremely weak. The isolated nature of the sale of the apartment
building made repetition improbable; the fact that the buyer approached
the seller, who initially had no intention to sell, points out the absence of
the solicitation/public offering component; and the bargaining power re-
lationship between the seller and the buyer, if not equal, was not greatly
disproportionate. Thus, under this test, the Allen court was correct in
finding no effect on the public interest.106
In Brown v. Charlton, 107 the court of appeals case involving the pri-
vate water system, the conclusion that the public interest requirement
was not met can also be explained with the suggested tests. While the
elements of unequal bargaining power and repeatability were present in
Brown, that of solicitation/public offering was not, since the water sys-
tem was operated for only a small, delimited, private group.
In Lightfoot 0 8 the attorney possessed greater bargaining power than
his client and, since his failure to act in her interest was within the scope
of his ordinary law practice, the act was repeatable. However, the ele-
ment of solicitation/public offering was very weak as evidenced by the
Lightfoot court's finding that the respondent attorney did not advertise
for or solicit clients. The opinion elaborated: "The appellant approached
the respondent voluntarily, and with expectations based upon his reputa-
tion, which she had learned from others whose opinions she apparently
respected."10 9 Thus, according to the proposed analysis, public interest
involvement was absent in Lightfoot because the requisite solicita-
tion/public offering component was absent.
The problem with explaining the Lightfoot result in this way is that it
raises the question of when a professional engages in conduct which can
be construed as solicitation or public offering. A supermarket chain that
advertises clearly meets this test, but so does a local drug store that does
not advertise and only identifies itself by a sign above the window. Anal-
105. 16 Wn. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24 (1976), discussed in notes 26-27 and accompanying text
supra.
106. More facts are needed to determine if Pilch v. Hendrix, 22 Wn. App. 531, 590 P.2d 370
(1979) was correctly decided. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra. It is unclear from the opin-
ion whether appellant, who did faulty construction work on respondent's residence, was a builder by
profession, or whether he advertised or solicited his services. Without answers to these questions,
the test for an effect on the public interest cannot be applied.
107. 90 Wn. 2d 362, 583 P.2d 1188 (1978). See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra (dis-
cussion of Brown).
108. Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wn. 2d 331, 544 P.2d 83 (1976).
109. Id. at 336, 544 P.2d at 91.
Washington Law Review
ogously, both a storefront legal clinic that operates a high volume, non-
complex service and a practitioner who advertises his services in a news-
paper are engaged in public offering or solicitation. The practitioner
whose sole means of public offering consists of a shingle outside her of-
fice or a listing in the yellow pages presents a more difficult case. The
Lightfoot court seems to be saying that some more active, aggressive
form of solicitation is required of a professional than of other businesses
in order to find public interest involvement. While this is a plausible re-
sult, it is difficult to see why the standard of solicitation/public offering
should be applied differently to merchants than it is to professionals.
Perhaps a more satisfactory explanation of the Lightfoot decision is
simply that the attorney's conduct did not constitute an unfair or decep-
tive act. A professional may perform an unfair or deceptive act causing
liability under the Consumer Protection Act" l0 by, for example, falsely
portraying himself as a licensed specialist or preparing a deceptive col-
lection letter and authorizing its use by a company. I "' However, it is dif-
ficult to construe mere negligent conduct as unfair or deceptive. 12 The
attorney's behavior in Lightfoot may be characterized as mere
negligence, and as such falls short of being an unfair or deceptive act or
practice.
The proposed three-part test for finding public interest involvement is
also consistent with those hypotheticals for which one would intuitively
expect a consumer protection act to provide a private remedy and those
for which no extrastatutory private remedy seems appropriate. For ex-
ample, one would not expect a private remedy for a consumer who
bought a secondhand piano from a private party who placed a classified
ad in the newspaper. Applying the test, it is clear that although the solici-
tation/public offering component is satisfied, those of unequal bargaining
power and repeatability are not. However, if the purchase were made at
an auction, the Act should apply because the three requirements would
be met.
V. CONCLUSION
The public interest requirement for private suits under the Washington
Consumer Protection Act is justified by reference to the purpose section
of the Act and to the historical context in which those abuses arose which
110. See, e.g., Comment, The Washington Consumer Protection Act v. The Learned Profes-
sional, 10 GoNz. L. REv. 435 (1975).
111. [1971] 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 7527.41.
112. Comment, supra note 110, at 452.
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the Act was designed to correct. The Washington courts added the re-
quirement to limit the scope of the private remedy to those actions which
present a substantial risk to the public, a function served in other states
by other types of statutory provisions. This approach is designed to bal-
ance freedom for individual businesspersons from excessive regulation
and litigation against compensation for injured consumers. It results in
emphasizing the enforcement function of the private remedy over the
compensation function.
The main problem with the courts' public interest requirement is that it
is difficult to apply. This vague and undefined term has been interpreted
by many courts and litigants as requiring a cumbersome and rather mean-
ingless counting of heads to prove the requisite effect on the public inter-
est. The meaning of the public interest requirement can be clarified with
a three-part test. For any transaction complained of, the following ques-
tions must be answered affirmatively before the public interest may be
deemed affected: (1) Did the seller possess bargaining power
disproportionate to that of the buyer? (2) Did the seller engage in conduct
which may be characterized as either solicitation or public offering? (3)
Is the act likely to recur? This test explains the Washington decisions in-
volving private suits under the Act and is consistent with hypothetical sit-
uations where a statutory private consumer remedy seems appropriate.
Carol Safron Gown
